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The end of WWI marked the beginning of discussions concerning the renewal of 
European interstate economic integration, which had been suspended because of 
military action and economic nationalism between rival countries. Among the intel-
lectual elite of that time, it was generally understood that tariff barriers and other 
obstacles, which hampered interstate trade, had to be removed, before the integra-
tion process could be resumed. But, the majority of European governments were not 
ready to abandon their protectionist economic policies. They were more concerned 
about guarding their independent national markets, than about creating a single 
European market. In the course of these events, some governments decided to act 
independently, by pursuing closer economic alliances with neighboring countries.
This article is devoted to the Austro-German customs union – the economic alliance 
project – which was never fulfi lled. Suffi ce to say, in March 1931, Austria and Ger-
many fi nalized the establishment of a customs union. At the same time, this project 
met with strong resistance from other European states, especially France, which ef-
fectively blocked the Austro-German initiative. It is worth noting, that France was 
not ready to accept any alienation of Austrian economic sovereignty on behalf of 
Germany, because France feared that Austrià s political independence could later 
be jeopardized.
1. INTRODUCTION
In Europe, in the aftermath of World War I, lively discussions were devoted 
to fi nding ways of intensifying economic cooperation within the continent. 
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This was because World War I had had terrible economic and political conse-
quences for further development in the whole of Europe, such as: demographic 
crisis, reduced production, very high unemployment, and a sharp drop in the 
level of personal incomes.
At the same time, WWI caused a process of disintegration of several Europe-
an empires, which resulted in the emergence of twenty new states. The most 
prominent example of this process was Austro-Hungarian Empire. According 
to the Hungarian Professor O. Jaszi, the Austro-Hungarian state, in case if it 
was converted to the federation in advance, could have solved the most fun-
damental problem of that time Europe, which was latter the problem of the 
League of Nations – how it is possible to unite national individualities of very 
divergent ideals and traditions in such a way that each of them can continue 
its own particular life, while at the same time limiting its national sovereignty 
enough to make a peaceful and effective international cooperation possible1.
The British scientist, S. Pollard, noticed that ‘….in contrast with the newly cre-
ated nation-state of the nineteenth century, which enlarged the economic area 
and operated in the direction of expansion and progress, the newly created na-
tion-state of the twentieth century became a fetter on effi ciency and progress, 
and lent its power to the turning back of the wheels of history....’2.  
It is well-known fact that the preparation of: economic, legal, and political 
projects, for the rapprochement of European states, took place at both civil and 
offi cial levels. Suffi ce to say, that at civil level, a very important role was played 
by the Pan-European Union (PEU), which consisted of politicians, profession-
als, and other parties, who were interested in a unifi ed Europe. The PEU was 
founded by Count Coudenhove Kalergi, in 1923, as an informal body, for re-
viewing the development of Britain and continental Europe. At the same time, 
at an offi cial level, the leading institution which had the necessary competence 
to deal with the reconciliation of European states was the League of Nations, 
which emerged as a result of post-WWI peace treaties. According to Art. 23 
(e) of its Covenant: ‘….member states are responsible for making provisions 
to secure and maintain the freedom of communications and of the transit and 
equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League….’3
Such diversity in views was explicitly shown during the World Economic 
Conference, which took place in Geneva in May 1927, under the auspices of 
the League of Nations. Representatives of 50 countries brought together 194 
1  Jaszi O., The Dissolution of The Habsburg Monarchy, Chacago, 1929, p. 4
2  Pollard  S., European Economic Integration 1815-1970, London, 1974, p. 132.
3  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp, last accessed on 01/12/2015.
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experts, including: merchants, fi nanciers, industrialists, economists, agricul-
turalists, offi cials with experience of commercial policy, and representatives 
of worker̀ s and consumer̀ s organizations. Despite such wide geographical 
participation, Professor Clavin of Britain noted the fact that, despite its ti-
tle, the Conference concentrated mainly on the problem of European protec-
tionism4. During the Conference, the political and expert elite did not have a 
unitary point of view concerning the mechanisms of solving the above men-
tioned problem. Some experts believed it appropriate to return to the practice 
of providing ‘most favored nation treatment’ in interstate trade relationships, 
in order to facilitate the liberalization of trade barriers. A second group of 
experts considered the establishing of international cross-border iron and steel 
cartels, and a fairer share of European markets as an essential approach to 
creating conditions, under which European states would not be encouraged to 
maintain existing or erect new, barriers in interstate trade. At the same time, 
a third group of experts thought that effective economic cooperation could 
be achieved only through preferential trade agreements, including economic 
and customs unions, which would anticipate a simultaneous elimination of all 
tariff and quantitative trade restrictions, together with a gradual liberalization 
of the movement of  workers, capital, and services.
Therefore, the fi nal report of the conference proposed a comprehensive pro-
gramme of economic rapprochement of European states5. Thus, it was stressed 
that harmful effects upon production and trade were the result of high and 
constant changing of tariffs, and inequalities in trading conditions. Taking this 
into account, the conference decided to put an end to the increase in tariffs and 
to move in the opposite direction6. In order to reach this ambitious goal, the 
Conference recommended that nations should take steps forthwith to remove 
or diminish those barriers that gravely hampered trade, starting with those 
which had been imposed to counteract the effects of disturbances arising out 
of the war by:
1) abandoning the practice of putting into force, in advance of negotiations, 
excessive duties established for the purpose of bargaining, whether by 
means of ‘tariffs de combat’ or by means of general tariffs;
2) proceeding to the conclusion of long-term commercial treaties securing 
equality of treatment;
4  Clavin P., Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, New 
York, 2013, p. 42.
5  Report of the conference, The Economic consequences of the League: collection of the 
articles, London, 1928, p. 160. 
6  Ibid.,  p. 180.
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3) giving the widest and most unconditional interpretation to the ‘most-fa-
vored-nation clause’. States should grant each other unconditional most-fa-
vored-nation treatment as regards customs duties and conditions of trading. 
4) considering the desirability of providing commercial treaties for the refer-
ence of disputed questions, as to the interpretation or carrying out of the 
treaties to arbitration or preferably Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice.
According to the fi nal report of the conference, the insertion into any particu-
lar treaty of special provisions ‘to meet local needs’ was not inconsistent with 
MFN obligations, so long as such provisions are clearly expressed and do not 
injure the interests of other states. In other word, the report allowed the states 
to be engaged in special relations (presumably such as a customs union), if it 
could be justifi ed by local needs and did not represent a threat to other states.
During the interwar period, attempts were made among several European 
countries to switch from purely theoretical discussions, to the realization of 
defi nite schemes regarding economic integration. However, political factors 
frequently prevented the successful implementation of integration projects. 
One such example in 1931 concerned the project of the Austro-German cus-
toms union. Despite the fact that it was never implemented, historical analysis 
of this document seems relevant to today, because it can facilitate a better 
understanding of the nature and history of XX century European interstate 
economic integration.  
2.  AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH NEIGHBORING 
COUNTRIES
Throughout most of the XIX century, Prussia and Austria were struggling for 
economic and political hegemony in Germany. Despite Prussian success in 
the emergence of the German empire, many Germans and Austrians regard-
ed this fact as temporary and felt sure of the future destiny of the two states. 
Negotiations about the creation of a single economic area for both empires 
continued even during WWI. However, because of strong opposition expressed 
by non-German peoples within the Austria-Hungarian Empire, and German 
industrialists, the scheme failed. The defeat of the Axis forces in WWI, to-
gether with the collapse of old empirical regimes seemed to draw these two 
states even closer.
The fi rst offi cial step towards creating a union of German Austria with Ger-
many was taken on November 12, by the Provisional Assembly of German 
Austria, when it adopted a resolution which declared that: ‘….German Austria 
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is a democratic Republic. All public authority is instituted by the People….
German Austria is a constituent part of the German Republic….’ On November 
13, a telegram was sent to the German government, requesting its support for 
German Austria in its attempt to join Germany and to enter into negotiations 
with the Austrian government ‘concerning participation in the law-making and 
administration of the German Reich’7. The reaction on behalf of Germany was 
formulated in the opening address of Chancellor Ebert, and the elected Presi-
dent of the German National Constituent Assembly, Dr. David, both of whom 
expressed their heartfelt desire for the union8. 
In the mid 1920s, Austria started diplomatic negotiations concerning the cre-
ation of an economic union among states in the Danube region, including Hun-
gary, and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, all efforts were in vain, because those 
neighboring states did not want to forsake even the smallest part of recently 
obtained national sovereignties, despite the economic gains which could have 
been brought by the implementation of this project. Owing to this situation, 
Austrian foreign policy was redirected towards encouraging Germany to cre-
ate a customs union, and the Austrian bourgeoisie supported the move, be-
cause they were unconcerned about the subjugation of Austria by ‘German 
imperialism’.  In turn, Germany pursued an open free trade policy, and was not 
interested in concluding agreements which would have been discriminatory to 
other countries. The reluctance of Germany to enter into a customs union with 
Austria can also be explained for purely pragmatic reasons, because Austria 
occupied twelfth place in its exports to Germany, and only twentieth in respect 
of German imports. Towards the end of World War I, negotiations concerning 
economic unifi cation between Austria and Germany were in progress, yet both 
parties limited themselves to creating a free trade area which excluded certain 
groups of goods.
At the end of the 1920s, under the infl uence of external and internal poli-
tics, German attitudes towards possible economic integration with Austria had 
started to change. First, Germany faced severe economic crisis, which were 
partly the result of the loss of American investment capital because of the fi -
nancial crisis in the USA, and second, public opinion started to incline towards 
support for the German Nazi party. So, according to German historian, A. 
Dorpalen, ‘…..for the government of that time, it was very important to gain a 
victory on a ‘foreign-policy front’, which would strengthen its position within 
the country….’9.
7  Ball M., Post-war German-Austrian relations. The Anschluss movement, 1918-1936, Cali-
fornia, 1937, p. 8.
8  Ibid., p. 15.
9  Dorpalen A., Germania na zare fawisma, Moskva, 2008, s. 218. 
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Between 1929 and 1931, the governments of Austria and Germany were se-
cretly conducting negotiations in order to establish a prospective ‘customs 
union’, or some kind of customs and economic alliance.  In analyzing the 
progress of negotiations, we can conclude that, unlike Austria, which would 
receive considerable economic and fi nancial dividends from this venture, Ger-
many would be a ‘political benefi ciary’,  and therefore Germany considered 
a customs union as a mechanism that could be used to effectively infl uence 
Austria, even with regard to it possibly joining Germany. This question was 
also touched upon by J. Verner, who concluded that, ‘….the case of Austria in 
1931 would appear to be the only modern case where are any country valuing 
its independence has nevertheless shown readiness to risk that independence 
for economic reasons, but Austria was acting from economic despair’10.
The situation was even more complicated, because  negotiations had to be kept 
secret, especially from France, Great Britain, and Czechoslovakia, who were 
strongly opposed to any ‘Anschluss’ between Austria and Germany. 
3.  POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE AUSTRO-
GERMAN UNIFICATION
In 1919, during the Treaty of Versailles,11 negotiations between the Allies and 
Germany, the president of France, G. Clemenceau, insisted on strict terms and 
obligations for Germany in respect of its foreign affairs and external trade 
policy. According to Art. 80 of this Treaty, Germany should ‘….acknowledge 
and respect strictly the independence of Austria….’ and agree that ‘….Austrian 
independence is inalienable….’. There are similar provisions in the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye (SGT)12, which was concluded between the Allies and 
Austria, at the outbreak of WWI. Pursuant to art. 88 of this Treaty, Austria 
undertook an obligation to refrain from any activities which can ‘…directly or 
indirectly compromise its independence’. 
Both treaties also contained specifi c provisions regarding the prohibition of 
trade discrimination.  For instance, Art. 264 of the Treaty of Versailles, for-
bade goods from one of the Allied or Associated countries being subjected 
to higher duties, charges, or quantitative restrictions, in comparison to other 
countries (Art. 217 SGT equivalent). 
10 Viner J., Customs Union issues, New York, 2014, p. 131.
11 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp, last accessed on 01/12/2015.
12 https://archive.org/stream/peacetreaties00alli/peacetreaties00alli_djvu.txt, last accessed 
on 01/12/2015.
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The Treaty of Versailles also dealt with measures equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions, in particular, it was prohibited to impose any ‘discriminative re-
gimes’ concerning the importation or exportation in interstate trade with Allied 
countries by introducing new customs regulations or procedures, methods of 
verifi cation, an analysis of the conditions of payment of duties, tariff classifi ca-
tion or interpretation, or the operation of monopolies (Art. 218 SGT equivalent). 
One safeguarding provision, which was intended to exclude Germany from any 
preferential trade regime, was contained in art. 267, which stressed that ‘….ev-
ery favor, immunity or privilege in regard to the importation, exportation or 
transit of goods granted by Germany to any Allied or Associated country or to 
any other foreign country whatever, shall simultaneously and unconditionally, 
without request and without compensation, be extended to all Allied or Asso-
ciated countries (Art 220 SGT equivalent). Thus, we can conclude that both the 
above mentioned treaties allowed Germany and Austria to liberalize their inter-
state trade by using ‘most favored nation regime’ which should automatically 
have delivered economic benefi ts to all most favored nations. 
At the same time, Germany and Austria were forbidden to establish any kind 
of preferential trade regime (like customs union), even despite the fact that at 
that time ‘full customs unions’ were generally allowed and were subject to ex-
emption from MFN obligations, if they completely satisfi ed the main criteria, 
such as: the complete elimination of tariffs between member territories; the 
establishment of a uniform tariff on imports from outside the union, and the 
apportionment of customs revenue between the members in accordance with 
an agreed formula. If all these criteria were fulfi lled, this economic entity 
could be regarded as a full customs union, and participating states could be 
excluded from obligations which arose under the MFN clause, but if one of 
its criteria was not fulfi lled, then that state had to adhere to its international 
commercial obligations, under the MFN clause. 
Such negligence of Allied countries regarding established international custom 
can be explained as a fear that eventually any ‘integration economic schemes’ 
which involve Germany, and a weaker neighbor, would lead to political inte-
gration, especially taking into account the experience of German ‘Zollverein’ 
in the XIX century. A contemporary of those events, American Professor Rob-
ert C. Binkley expressed the viewpoint, that in case Austro-German customs 
union would lead to the annexation to Germany, this result would follow, not 
from the customs union itself, but from the nationalist sentiment which favored 
equally both a customs union and ‘Anschluss’13.
13  Binkley Robert C., Europe Faces the Customs Union, Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. 7 
(3) 1931, last accessed on 01/12/2015.
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 Therefore, it should be stressed that Austrian obligation not to enter into any 
union with Germany was also refl ected in other international documents, such 
as protocol signed under the auspice of League of Nations in 1922, by which 
the Austrian government again undertook an obligation to refrain from en-
tering in special union relations with other countries. Since Austria was ex-
periencing a disastrous economic situation, she needed substantial fi nancial 
resources to stabilize its budget and monetary system. As British scientist, 
W. Henderson, pointed out, it was quiet understandable that the problems of 
reconstruction were beyond the resources of the Austrian government and it 
was clear that assistance from outside was essential14. In October 1922, Brit-
ain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, agreed to underwrite a loan of 25 mil-
lion pounds Sterling to Austria on the security of revenues derived from the 
customs and tobacco monopoly. A commissioner general, nominated by the 
League, was appointed to supervise the carrying out of various reforms which 
the Austrian government promised to introduce so as to balance the next bud-
get.  According to Protocol No. 1, signed between Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Czechoslovakia, and Austria15, in October 1922, the government of the Federal 
Republic of Austria undertook in accordance with the terms of Article 88 of 
the Treaty of St. Germain, not to alienate its independence and to abstain from 
any negotiations or from any economic and fi nancial engagement, calculated 
directly or indirectly to compromise this independence. Nevertheless, Austria 
still had the opportunity to realize its freedom in the matter of customs tariffs 
and commercial relations, provided that she would not violate her economic 
independence by granting to any state, a special regime, or exclusive advan-
tage, calculated to threaten this independence. 
In this harsh political and legal situation, Germany and Austria together had 
to search for opportunities to bypass obstacles, which arose from the tough 
obligations of international agreements.
4.  AUSTRO-GERMAN PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE 
CREATION OF THE CUSTOMS UNION 
AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS
On 18-19 March 1931, during closed meetings between the German and Aus-
trian governments, a preliminary agreement in the form of protocol concern-
ing the creation of the customs union was adopted16. The main task of the de-
14  Henderson W., The Genesis of the Common Market, London, 1962, p. 118. 
15  http://libraryresources.unog.ch/leagueofnationsarchives, last accessed on 01/12/2015.
16  Text of Protocol of Vienna of 1931, London, 1932, pp. 3-6.
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signers of this protocol was to minimize the effect it could provoke in Western 
European capitals, especially Prague, and Paris. That̀ s why in the provision 
1.1. of this protocol, it was outlined that the treaty is designated to ‘mark the 
beginning of a new order of European economic conditions on lines of region-
al agreements’. Suffi ce to say, that by 1929, the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, A. Briand, proposed the creation of a common market for a ‘rational 
organisation and commodity circulation’ in the framework of a European Fed-
eral Union project, by means of progressive liberalization and methodological 
simplifi cation of the movement of goods, capital, and people’.17 Also, in its 
memorandum, A. Briand underlined the necessity of counter-proposals from 
European states for the effective realization of this project. So, it is quite evi-
dent, that Austria and Germany wanted to present their integrative economic 
plan in the form of a general integration movement in Europe and as a concrete 
step in the general process of ‘tariff disarmament’. The confi rmation of this 
viewpoint it to be found in provision 1.2. of the protocol: ‘more especially both 
parties will in the treaty declare their willingness to enter into negotiations for 
a similar agreement with any other country expressing such a desire’. Accord-
ing to Professor Robert C. Binkley, this article pointed toward the formation 
of a Danubian customs union. Taking into account that the proposed unifi ed 
Austro-German area was industrialized, and that the lower Danubian coun-
tries were chiefl y agrarian, this meant that the farmers of Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Yugoslavia would have privileged markets, and not have to com-
pete  against Russian, American, and Argentinian wheat growers. From this 
standpoint, the customs union arrangement seemed mutually benefi cial to all 
potential parties concerned18. 
The most important achievement of this protocol was the agreement to grad-
ually introduce unifi ed customs legislation, and to harmonize tariffs (art. 2.) 
The exchange of goods between the two parties was not subject to any import 
or export duties (art.3). Also, it was forbidden to introduce: import, export, 
or transit, prohibitions. However, the parties reserved the right to introduce 
certain restrictions, if they were thought necessary for reasons of: public se-
curity, public health, or similar grounds, but any restrictions had to be speci-
fi ed as clearly as possible in the future treaty (art. 7). In order to avoid strong 
resistance in France and Czechoslovakia, the parties agreed to maintain their 
customs administrations independent of each other, but nevertheless the par-
ties had to ‘assure by special measures of a technical character the uniform 
17  Briand A., Memorandum on the organisation of a system of European Federal Union, New 
York, 1997, p. 33. 
18  Binkley Robert C., Europe Faces the Customs Union, Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. 7 
(3) 1931, last accessed on 01/12/2015.
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execution of the tariff law, the customs tariff, and other tariff regulations (art. 
5). Also, in provisions 9-10 of the protocol ‘all commercial relations with third 
countries are left in the sovereign domain of members of the union, however, 
the interests of other member-state had not to be violated’.  Protocol dictated 
that the customs union had to be in force for three years. According to art. 10, 
the abovementioned states took responsibility to harmonize with one another, 
and with the contents and object of the treaty, and, the existing commercial 
treaties concluded by them with third states so far as they might impair the 
execution of the existing import and export prohibitions and other regulations 
on the exchange of goods. Any disagreements had to be solved by the Arbitral 
Committee which consisted of representatives, on parity basis, from Austria 
and Germany (art.11). 
5.  OBJECTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTIES
Despite all assurances, the prospect of the creation of a customs union between 
Austria and Germany was perceived by France as an attempt by Germany to 
return to its expansionist policy, and was thus blocked by the French. Accord-
ing to German Professor Rosenberg, an essential principle of French policy 
in this period had been to encourage Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia, to form a dam against any German ‘Drang nach Osten’. The ob-
jections raised against the project, particularly in Paris and Prague, insisted 
that an economic union between Austria and Germany would be followed by 
political union, and that Czechoslovakia would thus be isolated, while Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania, would perhaps be subject to Ger-
man infl uence, and, as a result, European stability endangered19. Moreover, 
the Czechoslovakian government might be forced to consider the possibility 
of a joining a ‘German-dominated block’. The political price for this choice, 
according to the British Professor M. Newman, would be exceedingly high: 
Czechoslovakia would have certainly been asked to drop her alliance with 
France, which the former regarded as a guarantee for her independence. And, 
it was generally acknowledged, that inside a German-dominated bloc, the Su-
deten Germans, perhaps supported by the German government, would demand 
secession20.
Was it realistic to escape such a scenario, or was the ‘move of history’ irrevers-
ible? Professor Rosenberg thought that it might have been possible to prevent 
19  Rosenberg G., The struggle for a German-Austrian Customs Union 1815-1931, The Sla-
vonic and East European Review, Vol. 14 (41) 1946,  p. 341. 
20  Newman M. Britain and the German-Austrian Customs Union Proposal of 1931, European 
Studies Review, No 6 1976, p. 453. 
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such negative reactions from other European countries, but they were not suf-
fi ciently organized diplomatically. 
At the request of the French and British governments, the question of the Aus-
tro-German Customs union project and its compatibility with Austrià s inter-
national obligations, was considered by the Council of the League of Nations 
and then referred for an advisory opinion to the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. In court, Austria tried to prove that the customs union with 
Germany was a matter of life or death for the country, and argued that political 
domination of economic conditions by the Allied powers was responsible for 
economic stagnation in Europe. On the other hand, France and Czechoslovakia 
aggressively argued that the proposed customs union was the fi rst step toward 
carrying out Germany`s ‘Mittel-Europea project’, which had been blocked by 
the defeat of the Central powers in WWI. 
Moreover, France proposed a ‘Constructive memorandum dealing with the 
special situation in Austria’21. According to the provisions of this memoran-
dum, France offered to create some kind of ‘donor club’ to help Austria over-
come economic and fi nancial diffi culties. The proposed implementation of the 
memorandum, which would vary in each individual case, was that one coun-
try might grant tariff reductions on certain articles, and another in respect of 
transport, etc. This assistance would be provided on a provisional basis. Any 
departure from MFN obligations had to be strictly limited as regard the period 
of time, and the items which fall under its scope. At the same time, the French 
government stressed the necessity of providing such assistance to Austria, not 
by bilateral agreements, but by joint negotiations between the various states 
concerned and Austria22. The controversial character of this question can be 
illustrated by the voting results of deliberations within the Permanent Court 
of International Justice. Eight judges to seven declared the proposed customs 
union project incompatible with Austrià s treaty obligations23.  
Two days before the Court̀ s opinion was delivered, on September 3 1931, the 
Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Schroeber, and the German Foreign Minister, Dr. 
Curtius, made announcements abandoning on behalf of their respective coun-
tries the customs union project.
One very important event was the bankruptcy of one of Austrià s biggest banks 
– Credit-Anstalt bank. Under the pressure of foreign creditors, the Austrian 
21  Extract from French Constructive Memorandum dealing with the special situation of 
Austria of 1931, London, 1932, p. 6.
22  Ibid., p. 7.
23  Advisory opinion delivered by the Permanent Court of International justice of 1931, Lon-
don, 1932. p. 15.
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government was forced to underwrite all holdings which were at the bank`s 
disposal, which caused a worsening of the general economic situation in the 
country. It is necessary to mention that a substantial role in the restoration of 
fi nancial soundness of Credit-Anstalt bank was through French bankers, who 
used their infl uence to bring pressure to bear on Austria. So, on 16 June 1931, 
a representative of the French bank consortium notifi ed the Austrian Finance 
Ministry that the necessary credit could only be granted if Austria refused a 
union with Germany.
It is worth to mention that on 15 July, 1932, there was signed the additional 
protocol between Austria on one side, and Belgium, Great Britain, France 
and Italy on the other24. According to preamble of this document, above 
mentioned countries agreed to assist Austria fi nancially on the basis of the 
Protocol 1 from 1922 (reaffi rmation of sole obligation to abstain from any 
alienation of its independence). The loan was granted for a term of twenty 
years (Art. 2 /iv/). The Austrian government undertook to take all necessary 
steps to restore without delay and to maintain complete equilibrium between 
the revenue and expenditure of the state, and in particular, to carry out the 
programme of budgetary and fi nancial reforms (Art. 4). Finally, the Austri-
an monetary policy had to lie in direction of the progressive removal of the 
control over exchange transactions and the resulting obstructions to interna-
tional trade (Art. 5).
6. CONCLUSION
In summing up, it should be noted that despite the political calculations of 
Germany, the attempt to create an Austro-German customs union had great 
economic implications, because it was an endeavor to return to European eco-
nomic cooperation and integration, which had developed, over previous centu-
ries, prior to the outbreak of WWI. 
The failure of this venture showed the deep distrust and antagonism which ex-
isted in interstate relations within Europe at that time. Nevertheless, even this 
prospect of creating a customs union was a further important step towards the 
restoration of European interstate economic integration.
The history of the Customs Union project also showed that in spite of the 
many declarations made, European states were not willing to abandon their 
protectionist policies, and instead were preferring to maintain the economic 
discordance, which existed in Europe at that time. This situation also raised 
24  Austrian Protocol No 3118, League of Nations Treaty series. Vol. 135, pp. 286-299.
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the question of the compatibility of the customs unions and the obligations 
which states took upon themselves under the MFN clause.
Taking into consideration the tendencies which persisted at that time, we can 
say for certain that the idea of universalism vested in the League of Nations 
prevailed over the idea of an eventual fully-integrated Europe. 
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